For convenience of explanation, the description below focuses on BM. The invention is by no means bound by this example and is aimed at intercepting any targets having predictable flight trajectory.
As is well known, interception of ballistic missiles is a difficult task. One of the major factors that hinders the interception mission is that the target BM develops after boost phase a relatively high flight velocity. This naturally results in a very high closing velocity of the intercepting platform (normally an intercepting missile) when approaching the target BM. The very high closing velocity imposes undue operational constraints on the various on-board and ground-based tracking and homing sub-systems that are associated with the intercepting platform, in order to accomplish successful destruction within an instant.
These constraints led to the development of a state-of-the-art on-board and ground based technologies (e.g. the joint U.S.--Israel ARROW system and the U.S. THAAD) in order to meet the operational specification of the intercepting mission.
Whilst the specified systems are a priori designed to perform the interception under given high velocity conditions, this does not mean that they will succeed in accomplishing the mission under ANY closing velocity conditions. Consider, for example, a first scenario in which a tactical ballistic missile (TBM) is launched from a first country to a second country. If the attacked state is protected, say, by the Arrow anti-TBM system, the latter will detect the launched missile by its early warning constituent, and in response to such an early warning, an Arrow missile will be launched so as to intercept the target TBM at a pre-planned interception zone under first closing velocity conditions.
Consider now a second scenario where the specified TBM is launched from a longer range, say from a third state. Naturally, the TBM will reach a higher velocity (as compared to the first scenario) when it approaches the interception zone, and considering that the flight velocity of the intercepting missile does not change as compared to the first scenario, the inevitable consequence is that the interception should now be implemented under second (higher) closing velocity constraints.
The varying closing velocity conditions impose yet another difficulty on systems such as the ARROW or THAAD to accomplish successful interception under any possible scenario. Put differently, the larger the closing velocity, the more strict are the timing constraints posed on the interceptor in order to accomplish successful interception. Likewise, under high closing velocity conditions, the accuracy operational specification of the sensors are increased.
It goes without saying that failure to give adequate answer to even one possible threat scenario, i.e. leakage of the target TBM to the friendly territory, will bring about dire consequence.
There is, accordingly, a need in the art to substantially simplify the complexity of the anti-BM system as compared to systems which operate under high and varying closing-velocity constraint.